Overreliance on Technology inWarfare: The Yom Kippur War as a Case Study

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October War_Effective Egyptian Preprarations Enable Strategic Surprise

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Greatest Tank Battles - The October War: Battle for the Sinai

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Santa Monica: Rand, Each fall they called up their reserves, much like Israel, to perform their annual duty requirements. Units moved to the Suez Canal, repaired and upgraded defensive positions, executed a water crossing, and established a defensive line in the desert. Through their honest self-analysis Egypt recognized their activity profiles provided them with several strengths they could capitalize on. One of these was warning fatigue.

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The Israelis had witnessed Egyptian forces mobilize into battle formations and move to the Canal five times by May and yet no war. The decision makers would be less willing to commit to another expensive mobilization, especially as Israeli elections were October 28th. Egypt needed this warning fatigue to extend to the mobilization of its reserves.

Egypt had greater latitude than Israel to call up reserves without ill effects but that did not make it immune. With annual reserve duty mobilizations coming and the size of the Tahrir 41 wargame which would include army headquarters units and division level exercises it would seem natural that the reserve buildup was larger than usual to capitalize on this training event. When the invasion force demobilized it also hid their bridging assets near the Canal. The Israelis could simply mark the coordinates on the map and strike them on artillery.

During the May mobilization Egypt had built 65 ramps to confuse the Israelis about which would actually be used as the crossing points.